OpenRouter says prompts sent to MiniMax may have been read

OpenRouter says prompts sent to MiniMax may have been read

OpenRouter has sent an email to some users titled "Your requests to MiniMax models may have been read." According to the email, between July and October 2026 a security researcher embedded a set of unique test links in prompts and sent them to MiniMax models. Between 40 and 130 hours after the requests were sent, a third party opened those links.

The links appeared only inside the prompts. If someone opened them, the contents of those prompts reached a person or a system outside the inference pipeline.

What the email says

A developer who received the email posted the full text in a developer community, noting that OpenRouter has no public page and no blog post on the matter. Per the email, the test links were accessed whether the request was handled by MiniMax directly or forwarded to MiniMax by another provider. AtlasCloud, Novita and StreamLake have told OpenRouter that they forwarded requests for MiniMax models on OpenRouter to MiniMax.

The researcher also ran controls. The same tests sent to other models on these providers were not accessed, with one exception, and not a single AWS test key planted in the requests was ever used.

OpenRouter was blunt about where it places responsibility:

Based on what the researcher and these providers have reported, the issue sits with MiniMax and the providers that forwarded to it, not with OpenRouter.

Paraphrase: by the account of the researcher and these providers, the fault lies with MiniMax and the providers that passed requests on to it, not with OpenRouter.

The email then adds that OpenRouter is "only relaying what they told us." The one piece of information it offers from MiniMax is also secondhand: MiniMax told StreamLake that content moderation was enabled on its endpoints before October 22, and that zero data retention has been enabled since. OpenRouter says it has asked MiniMax for an official statement and has not yet received one.

The Zero Data Retention label is pulled

OpenRouter's only action so far is to remove the Zero Data Retention label from these MiniMax model endpoints while the investigation continues. Coverage of the email notes that it also advises users who put sensitive credentials in prompts to rotate their API keys and passwords.

Zero data retention is a filter on aggregation services. Many enterprise users tick "only route to zero-data-retention providers" in their routing settings and treat it as a compliance baseline. In this case, links written into prompts were still opened during the months the label was displayed. The email does not say who verifies the label or how often.

The "content moderation" explanation could account for part of what was observed. A moderation system that fetches links found in prompts, or hands content to human reviewers, could produce visits dozens of hours later. But the email uses the words "a third party," and whether the visitor was MiniMax's moderation step, a contractor or someone else cannot currently be verified.

What developers in China should check

MiniMax is a Chinese company, and many developers call its models through aggregation services, using them for batch jobs or as the base for agents. For these users the email raises three concrete tasks.

First, go through your logs. The email lists, for each account, which providers handled requests to MiniMax models, in which time windows, and how many. If you used them between July and October, check what you actually sent.

Second, rotate credentials. Agent applications often paste database connection strings, internal API tokens and signed download links straight into prompts. That the AWS test keys went unused is a reasonably good sign, but a link being opened already shows the content left the inference pipeline, so any real credential that was in a prompt should be treated as leaked.

Third, do not treat direct access as an exception. The email states that requests handled directly by MiniMax also triggered visits. Whether users who bypass OpenRouter and call MiniMax's official API were subject to the same moderation over the same period, MiniMax has not said publicly.

Another investigation the same week

At nearly the same time, Ars Technica reported on an investigation into the AI inference supply chain. In a passage developers have been quoting, the researchers say that in late October they placed each key in a single request sent to a single provider, and that every request sent in those time windows was stolen; some requests were rejected by the provider before the model ever ran, and the keys were lost anyway. The investigation also mentions that in two other leaks, some of the stolen requests carried a zero-data-retention flag.

Some developers in the discussion have tied the two matters together. Whether they come from the same researcher, or whether the providers involved overlap, cannot be confirmed from public information, and OpenRouter's email does not mention the investigation.

All that can be said for certain is the sequence: the researcher's tests span July to October, the cutoff MiniMax's side gave is October 22, and the email was posted publicly by a user in late November. Who knew what during that month in between, and why there was no announcement, will have to wait for official statements from MiniMax and OpenRouter.

Sources: OpenRouter's email to users (full text posted publicly by a developer), CocoLoop, Ars Technica's related investigative report; checked the months covered by the tests, the 40-to-130-hour access interval, the list of three forwarding providers and the handling of the Zero Data Retention label.